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Correction to “Byzantine Agreement in Expected Polynomial
Time"
Valerie King ∗ Jared Saia †
Abstract
This is a correction to the paper “Byzantine Agreement in Expected Polynomial Time" which
appeared in the Journal of the ACM in 2016. It corrects a failure in the paper to consider the
adversary’s ability to decide the number of fair coinflips in an iteration, where this number
ranges between n(n− t) and n(n− 2t).
1 Introduction
In [3], King and Saia describe an algorithm to solve Byzantine agreement in expected polynomial
time. Their general strategy is to run an algorithm based on work of Ben-Or [1] (cf. Bracha [2])
that depends on simulating a global coin. In every iteration of the Ben-or type algorithm, there is
a direction that is good in the sense that if the simulated global coin lands in that direction, the
processors come to agreement and terminate.
King and Saia simulate a global coin via summing coinflips from all processors, and measuring
the deviation from zero of this sum. They show that in each iteration, with constant probability
there is large “good" deviation by the good coinflips in the good direction. When this occurs, if there
is no agreement, then there must be “bad" deviation caused by the adversarially-controlled (bad)
processors which counterbalances the good deviation. Eventually, the deviation by bad processors
becomes unusually frequent and detectable, so that good processor will eventually exclude these
from their calculations in future global coin simulations.
In each iteration of the Ben-Or type algorithm, each good processor generates a stream of up to
n fair coinflips. In Section 4.1, Property 2 of x-sync ensures that at most t of the coinflip streams
generated by good processors contain fewer than n coinflips. It was recently observed by Melnyk,
Wang and Wattenhoffer [4] that the analysis in [3] failed to take into account the effect that an
adversarial stopping strategy on these t streams may have on the value of the sum of coinflips
generated by good processors.
In this brief announcement, we correct this issue. First, we show (Fact 3 below) that we can
bound the maximum value obtained during a stream of tn coins, and pessimistically use this max-
imum in lieu of the final sum of tn coins. Next, we describe additional slight changes required in
the analysis of the remainder of the paper to account for this new bound. This includes decreasing
the constant factor in the resilience for the polynomial time algorithm, Variant 1.
2 Corrections in Section 5
First, insert the following result [5], as Fact 3 in Section 5.1.
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Fact 3: Let Mn be the maximum value of a symmetric, 1-dimensional random walk after n steps
and let Sn be the value of the random walk at step n. For a symmetric random walk, for any r ≥ 1,
Pr(Mn ≥ r) = Pr(Sn = r) + 2Pr(Sn > r), which implies Pr(Mn ≥ r) < 2Pr(Sn ≥ r).
The JACM paper identifies two sources of bad deviation other than that caused by coinflips from
bad processors: (1) coinflips from ≤ t good processors which have been excluded because they are
thought to be bad which sum to ≤ β/2; and (2) t deviation caused by a total of t “ambiguous" coins
(from the asynchrony). In this writeup, we add (3), the effect of the adversary possibly stopping
up to t of the good coinflip streams.
2.1 Our Corrections
We change β/2 to β/4 for each of the coinflips of type (1) and type (3) and modify Lemma 5.2 to
account for these effects.
Lemma 5.2. (1) A stream of between 1 and nt coin flips which can be stopped adversarially
anywhere in this range has deviation exceeding β/4 =
√
2n(n− t)/4− t/2 with probability at most
(1/2)e−(β/4)
2
/2nt. If t < .005n, then this probability is at most e−11.
(2) A stream of between n(n − 2t) and n(n − t) coin flips which can be stopped adversarially
anywhere in this range has deviation of at least α′ =
√
2n(n− 2t)− β/4 in any specified direction
with probability exceeding 1/20.
Proof. (1) Consider a random walk of nt steps, starting at the origin, where each step is equally
likely to be 1 or -1. By Fact 3, the probability that its maximum value is at least β/4 is no more
than twice the probability that the sum of nt coin flips is at least β/4, which is at most 2e−(β/4)
2/2tn
(by Lemma 5.2 old). If t < .005n, then this probability is at most e−11.
(2) The stream consists of the first n(n − 2t) good coins plus a stream which the adversary can
stop at any point afterwords. By Lemma 5.1, the first part of the stream has deviation α with
probability greater than .211. The second part of the stream can, in the worst case, be adjusted
by the adversary to the maximum deviation achieved which equals or exceeds β/4 (in the opposite
direction) with probability at most e−11. The probability that the entire stream has deviation at
least α′ is at least the probability that the first event occurs and the second doesn’t. Hence the
probability that the entire stream has deviation α′ is at least .211 − e−11 > 1/20.
Additional corrections in Section 5 are as follows.
• In Lemma 5.3: (1) Replace α by α′; and (2) Replace β/2 by β/4.
• In proof of Lemma 5.3: Change “From Lemma 5.1" to “From Lemma 5.2(2)"
• In Lemma 5.4: (1) Change α to α′; and (2) Change β/2 to β/4
• In proof of Lemma 5.4, line 7 page 14: Change β/2 to β/4
• In Lemma 5.5: Change t < n/36 to t < 1/72.
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3 Corrections for Variant 1
For Variant 1: Let H be the matrix filled by a stream of independent, random −1, 1 coinflips except
in up to t adversarially chosen columns. In these columns, the adversary picks points to stop the
stream as it is filling a column, and the rest of the column (the suffix) is filled with 0’s.
Then H = H ′ +W where H ′ is a matrix of −1, 1 independent, random coin flips, and W is all
0’s except the suffixes in columns changed by the adversary, where its entries are the negation of
the columns of H ′.
Now change the definition of G, in Section 6, second paragraph after Theorem 6.1 as follows.
“All entries of G in columns controlled by bad processors are set to 0. For j corresponding to a
good processor, the (i, j) entry of G is the sum of the j-th column for the matrix H generated in
iteration i of Algorithm 5."
Then insert the following two paragraphs immediately before Corollary 6.2. “Note that G =
R + Z, where R is a matrix where every entry in each good column is set to the sum of n fair
coinflips, and every entry in each bad column is set to 0. Additionally, Z is a matrix where the
(i, j) entry is the sum of the j-th column of the matrix W generated in iteration i of Algorithm 5."
“By a property of matrix norms, |G| ≤ |R| + |Z|. Hence, Pr(|G| > a) ≤ Pr(|R| + |Z| > a) ≤
Pr(|(R| > a/2) + Pr(|Z| > a/2), where the last step holds by a union bound. Pr(|R| > a/2) is
bounded by Theorem 6.1. Pr(|Z| > a/2) is bounded by Theorem 6.1 as well. Note that Z is a
matrix of independent random variables some of which are set to 0 and some of which are distributed
as the sum of a number of coinflips between 1 and n. The number is set adversarially but this does
not affect the analysis.
Next, change the statement of Corollary 6.2 to refer to both the matrices Z and R, instead of
G, and insert the following statement after Corollary 6.2: “Applying Corollary 6.2 to both Z and
R, we have Pr(|G| > (6 + 2ǫ)
√
n(m+ n)) < 2(m+ n)−1."
In Lemmas 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, and their proofs, replace the expression 3 + ǫ with 6 + 2ǫ, and
the expression 4+ ǫ with 7+2ǫ. In proof of Lemma 6.7, replace 1/(m+n) by 2/(m+n) each time it
appears. In statement of Lemma 6.7 and Theorem 1.1, replace t < 4.25∗10−7n by t < 3.3∗10−8n.
In the paragraph before Lemma 6.4, replace "When t < n/36, β/2 > 23n/36" with "When
t < 10−6n, (β/2)2 > .49999n2" and replace the sentence “Then this inequality holds..." with “Then
this inequality holds when t < c1n(.183
2)β2
6(7+2ǫ)2n2 , which requires t < (2/3)(.001)(.0183)
2(.49999)2(7 +
2ǫ)−2n ≤ 1.14 ∗ 10−9n.
4 Corrections for Variant 2
For Variant 2, we need to change Lemma 7.1 as follows.
Bottom of page 18: Omit “Further, note...Throughout the proof". Insert “The maximum sum of
the coinflips of t possibly incomplete streams of up to a total of c1mnt coins is no greater than
the maximum value of a random walk reached during this many steps. Hence, by Lemma 5.2, the
probability that X ≥ (β/6)c1m is no greater than 2Pr(Y ≥ (β/6)c1m), where Y is the summation
of ntc1m random coinflips."
Make the following changes to the proof of Lemma 7.1:
Substitute Y for X in the third paragraph of Lemma 7.1 and the first line of the first set of
equations. In the second set of equations, add a factor of 2 in front of the right side of each equation
except the last.
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